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Abstract
Motivated by classical political economy we detail a probabilistic, “statis-
tical equilibrium” approach to explaining why even in equilibrium, the equal-
ization of profit rates leads to a non-degenerate distribution. Based on this
approach we investigate the empirical content of the profit rate distribution for
previously unexamined annual firm level data comprising over 24,000 publicly
listed North American firms for the period 1962-2014. We find strong evidence
for a structural organization and equalization of profit rates on a relatively short
time scale both at the economy wide and one- and two-digit SIC industry levels
into a Laplace or double exponential distribution. We show that the statistical
equilibrium approach is consistent with economic theorizing about profit rates
and discuss research questions emerging from this novel look at profit rate dis-
tributions. We also highlight the applicability of the underlying principle of
maximum entropy for inference in a wide range of economic topics.
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1 Introduction
One of the most pervasive assumptions in contemporary economic theories spanning
various traditions is that competition leads to the formation of equal profit rates
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for all firms in equilibrium. Yet, it is well understood by most economists that this
situation, which predicts a “degenerate” distribution of profit rates, never actually
obtains in reality as observed rates of profit tend to perpetually fluctuate. Available
data from national accounts, that report only industry or sectoral averages but no
higher moments of the distribution, and a theory that stresses the uniformity of
profit rates reinforce the focus on a single rate of profit.
The English classical tradition that began with Adam Smith offers an alternative
theoretical approach. Instead of neglecting deviations from the mean, the observed
distribution of prices and profit rates are seen as inherent to the process of compe-
tition and should be considered as the equilibrium state of competition itself. The
appropriate method of analysis is, therefore, not that of the average profit rate,
but a probabilistic approach that considers the entire spectrum of profit rates at
any moment captured by its probability density. From this perspective, the resid-
ual indeterminacy of profit rate deviations from the mean is provided with a rich
theoretical structure.
A probabilistic approach to analyzing the behavior of economic variables has
been proposed under the label of “statistical equilibrium” before to explain the dis-
tribution of prices, incomes and other variables. One of the earliest arguments for
a probabilistic approach to study profit rates was made by Farjoun and Machover
(1983) (henceforth FM). Invoking the classical economists, FM argue that the unifor-
mity assumption of profit rates is a “chimera” and “theoretical impossibility.” They
propose that prices and profit rates should be treated as random variables that are
driven not to a deterministic uniformity amongst capitals, but to time-invariant or
stationary probability distributions with general forms that are “theoretically ascer-
tainable and empirically verifiable.”1 With respect to the distribution of the rate of
profit, the authors go so far to as to claim the “theoretical and empirical evidence
suggests that the rate of profit has a so-called gamma distribution.”(Farjoun and
Machover, 1983, p. 27) However, FM never detail the theoretical rationale for their
claims, and they adduce little evidence for the rate of profit having any particular
distribution, let alone a gamma one.
In this paper we examine the notion of statistical equilibrium in economic theory
and show the validity of this type of reasoning applied to the classical political
economic theory about non-degenerate profit rate distributions, by studying the
empirical distribution of the rate of profit. We explain the precise theoretical footing
of FM’s approach, which they elide in their book with a vague reference to physics,2
and show that it is consistent with economic theorizing. Drawing on firm level
data for over 24,000 North American firms from 1962 to 2014 we use FM’s two
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conjectures: that profit rates are stationary, and that they are gamma distributed, to
discuss the shape of the distribution. We find strong evidence for a stationary profit
rate distribution, but show that the gamma hypothesis is unnecessarily restrictive
in its assumptions and poorly supported by the data. Rather, we find that the
general form of the profit rate distribution approximates the double exponential
or Laplace distribution, a distribution commonly found in industrial organization
research (Alfarano et al., 2012; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003a; Bottazzi and Secchi,
2003b; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006; M. Stanley et al., 1996). A probabilistic approach
shows profit rate distributions in a fresh light that leads to asking new questions
about competition and the determination of one of the most important variables in
economic theory.
The following section addresses the competitive process as a grounds for studying
statistical equilibrium, section three outlines the concept of statistical equilibrium
and its foundational principle of maximum entropy on which FM’s conjectures are
based. Section four introduces the dataset with which we explore FM’s conjectures
and section five shows the results obtained from analysis of the dataset. In section
six we offer an alternative more parsimonious distribution based on the principle
of maximum entropy, and in section seven we summarize our finding and discuss
avenues for further research.
2 Competition as a Disorderly Process
The assumption that all firms receive an equal rate of profit in equilibrium is a
common point of departure across much of the spectrum of contemporary economic
theory. The concept of equilibrium for profit rates predominantly comes in two
forms. In the first one, profit rates are a priori uniform amongst perfectly compet-
itive firms in an economy with all resources fully utilized; equilibrium is therefore
a tautology. Deviations from uniformity are a result either of “shocks” that cre-
ate a temporary disequilibrium with convergence back towards uniform rates, or
imperfect competition (Mueller, 1986).
The second form can be traced to Alfred Marshall’s concept of short- and long-
run partial equilibrium (Marshall, 1890, Book 5, ch 5). Marshall maintained that
while in the short run firms with different cost structures (the payment of profits or
“quasi-rents” to capital providers being a cost) may exist, in the long run firms will
enter or exit so as to force the price to equal the minimum average factor costs of the
incumbent firms, equalizing profit rates as one of the factor costs (Foley, 2011). The
divergence of rates of profit from uniformity is treated as a short-run phenomenon
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that can be abstracted from in the long run (Kurz and Salvadori, 1995). In either
case, equilibrium is understood as a state of uniformity.
The theory of equilibrium profit rates balances with the concomitant theory of
competition. Indeed, a different theory of competition will lead to an alternative
notion of how profit rates will appear over longer periods of time. A case in point
is the – as Sraffa pointed out “submerged and forgotten” – approach of the English
classical school and their critic, Karl Marx. Adam Smith (1904 [1776]) began from
the notion that it was the competitive disposition of capital to persistently seek
higher rates of profit and that through competition a tendency to the equalization of
profit rates across all competitive industries would emerge. Karl Marx would later
summarize competition as a perpetually turbulent and dynamic process whereby
“capital withdraws from a sphere with a low rate of profit and wends its way to
others that yield higher profit.” (Marx, 1981 [1894], pp. 297-298) This “constant
migration” of capital leads to a distribution of capital among the various spheres of
production and consequently a distribution of profit rates.
From this perspective, the dynamics of profit rate oscillations can be understood
as arising from a negative feedback mechanism. Capital seeking out sectors or
industries where the profit rate is higher than the economy-wide average, generates
new investment in these sectors attracting labor, raising output, and reducing prices
and profit rates.3 On the reverse side, firms’ departure from industries earning below
an average rate of profit has the opposite effect as the reduction in supply provides
an incentive for capital to leave the sector, which leads to higher prices and profit
rates for firms that remain in the sector. The important point is that the tendential
gravitation of each industry’s rate of profit is an unintended consequence of the
decisions of many individual firms. That is, firms do not choose their profit rates. It
is the entry and exit decisions of other firms in the process of competition that leads
to a realization of a profit rate at any point in time. Resolution of the process of
competition only emerges at the macroscopic scale as captured by the distribution
of the prime mover of capital, the rate of profit.4 Arguably, Marx was well aware of
this microscopic/macroscopic dichotomy as he states,
“[The] sphere [of circulation] is the sphere of competition, which is sub-
ject to accident in each individual case; i.e. where the inner law that
prevails through the accidents and governs them is visible only when
these accidents are combined in large numbers, so that it remains invis-
ible and incomprehensible to the individual agents of production them-
selves.” (Marx, 1981 [1894], p. 967)
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The question then is how to reconcile the ostensible disequilibrium phenomenon
of firm level profit rates with a robust notion of equilibrium? FM answer this
question by turning to the alternative theoretical framework of classical statistical
mechanics which allows them to explain how the observed “chaotic” movement of
capital can give rise to a time invariant equilibrium profit rate distribution. Below we
outline the intuition behind this notion of statistical equilibrium and its relationship
with information theory in order to emphasize this method as one of inference.
3 Statistical Mechanics and Statistical Equilibrium
The methods that Farjoun and Machover promote in Laws of Chaos are those of
statistical mechanics. While these methods have been well established in physics
for more than a century dating back to the foundational work of Maxwell (1860),
Boltzmann (1871) and Gibbs (1902), they have for the most part been unknown to
economists.5 Important exceptions include the theoretical work of Duncan Foley,
who coins the term statistical equilibrium in economics and uses it to model an ex-
change economy (Foley, 1994) and unemployment in a labor market (Foley, 1996),
the “classical econophysics” of Cottrell et al. (2009) who focus on the process of
production, exchange, distribution, and finance as a process of interacting physical
laws, a number of empirical studies on money, income and wealth distributions such
as Chatterjee, Yarlagadda, and Chakrabarti (2005), Dragulescu and V. Yakovenko
(2000), Franke (2015), Isaac (2014), Milakovic´ (2003), V. M. Yakovenko (2007),
Scharfenaker and Dos Santos (2015), Schneider (2015), and Shaikh, Papanikolaou,
and Wiener (2014), and the recent work of Alfarano et al. (2012) who apply the
principle of maximum entropy to profit rate distributions. Pioneering work in the
application of statistical physics to economics is also contained in the work of Man-
tegna and E. H. Stanley (2000) who explore uses for these methods in analyzing the
stock market. The recent work by Fro¨hlich (2013) also follows FM’s approach and
he finds evidence for gamma distributed profit rates using German input-output
tables. All of these works include to some extent the notion of maximum entropy,
either in its thermodynamic or its information theoretic form. We outline the basic
intuition behind the concept of maximum entropy as a form of inference as in Jaynes
(1957a), Jaynes (1957b), and Jaynes (1979). But in order to get to the inferential
approach relevant to the problem at hand, we begin with a basic problem in physics
that first led to the use of maximum entropy reasoning.
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3.1 Entropy in statistical mechanics
An elementary problem in statistical physics is describing the state of an “ideal”
gas, closed off from external influences, that consists of a very large number, N , of
identical rapidly moving particles undergoing constant collisions with the walls of
their container. The intention is to derive certain thermodynamic features at the
macroscopic level (such as temperature or pressure) of the gas from the microscropic
features of the gas, that is, from the configuration of all its particles. To describe
the microscopic state of this system, however, requires specification of the position
and momentum of each particle in 3-dimensional space. These 6N coordinates fully
describe the microstate the system is in, but for any reasonable system of interest
N  1 and the degrees of freedom make such a description a formidable task. This
problem invites a probabilistic approach to the determination of the microstate.
The state of a particle can be mapped from these 6N microscopic degrees of
freedom to an energy for the entire system. If we partition the state space of energy
levels into discrete “bins” we can categorize individual particles corresponding to
their level of energy associated with that particular bin. We can then describe the
distribution as a histogram vector {n1, n2, ..., nk} where k is the number of bins, ni
is the number of particles in bin i, and
∑
k nk = N , the total number of particles
(degrees of freedom). The histogram describes the distribution of energy over the N
particles but tells us nothing about the exact microscopic state of the system, i.e. the
precise location of each particle within each bin. Since there are many combinations
of particles that lead to the same distribution of particles over bins, any histogram
will correspond to many microstates. An ensemble is such a partition of the state
space with an assignment of probabilities that is a representation of the macro-
scopic state of the system from which the salient features of the gas are derivable.
The macrostate with the largest number of corresponding microstates describes the
“statistical equilibrium” of the system. The number of microstates corresponding
to any particular macrostate is the “multiplicity” of that macrostate. The insight of
statistical mechanics is that macrostates of the gas that can be achieved by a large
number of microstates, i.e. have higher multiplicity, are more likely to be observed
because they can be realized in a greater number of ways. Because of the combina-
torics, the multiplicity of a few macrostates will tend to be much higher than that
of all others, effectively allowing for the prediction that the system will be in those
highest or near highest multiplicity states most of the time.
To see this, compute the multiplicity of any microstate, that is the number
of combinations of particle distributions over bins, which can be expressed as the
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multinomial coefficient
N !
n1!n2!...nk!
=
N !
(N n1N )!(N
n2
N )!...(N
nk
N )!
=
N !
Np1!Np2!...Npk!
(1)
The numerator is the number of permutations of N and the denominator factors out
all permutations with the same particles in a bin to arrive at combinations only. For
large N , the Stirling approximation log[N !] ≈ N logN −N is a good approximation
to the logarithm of the multinomial coefficient.
log[
N !
n1!n2!...nk!
] ≈ N log[N ]−
k∑
i=1
Npilog[Npi] (2)
= N log[N ]−N log[N ]
k∑
i=1
pi −N
k∑
i=1
pilog[pi] (3)
= −N
k∑
i=1
pilog[pi] (4)
This sum is therefore an approximation of the logarithm of the combinations
(multiplicities) and is called entropy.6 The logarithm of the multiplicity is a concave
function of the probability nk/N = pi. Since the probabilities sum to one and since
the entropy is a concave function of the multiplicity, the entropy corresponding to
the macrostate with the largest multiplicity – entropy at its maximum – occurs when
all probabilities are equal, pi = k/N, ∀i.
Constraints on the possible configuration of particles can be imposed, since typ-
ically there is some knowledge about the system that makes some configurations
more or less probable. These tend to take the form of linear functions of the proba-
bilities. For example, imposing the condition that energy is conserved results in the
constraint on the mean energy in the system. Maximizing entropy (the concave ob-
jective function in Eq. 4), subject to the constraint that the momenta of the particles
result in a kinetic energy equal to the total energy of the system coarse-grained into
N discrete energy states,
∑N
j=1 xjpj = x¯ is a mathematical programming problem
that is quite familiar to economists (Foley, 2003).7
3.2 The maximum entropy principle of inference
Claude Shannon (1948), working on problems of digital communications at Bell
Labs in 1948, had a very practical interest in developing a consistent measure of the
“amount of information” in the outcome of a random variable transmitted across a
communication channel. He wanted logical and intuitive conditions to be satisfied
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in constructing a consistent measure of the amount of uncertainty associated with a
random variable X using only the probabilities pi[xi], xi ∈ X.8 Shannon discovered
that this measure of information, the average length of a message, was identical
to the expression for entropy in thermodynamics (Eq. 4). Shannon was interested
in assigning probabilities to messages so as to maximize the capacity of a commu-
nication channel. The physicist Edwin T. Jaynes (Jaynes, 1957a) recognized the
generality of Shannon’s result and discovered that this situation is not very different
from that in statistical mechanics, where the physicist must assign probabilities to
various states. He argued that the number of possibilities in either case was so great
that the frequency interpretation of probability would clearly be absurd as a means
for assigning probabilities. Instead, he showed that Eq. 4 is a measure of information
that is to be understood as a measure of uncertainty or ignorance.9 That is, the
probability assignment in Eq. 4 describes a state of knowledge in the sense common
to Bayesian reasoning.
From this perspective, Jaynes argued that imposing constraints on systems that
change the maximum entropy distribution, such as energy conservation, are just
instances of using information for inference. Inferring the maximum entropy dis-
tribution subject to information about the system is what Jaynes then referred to
as the principle of maximum entropy inference (PME).10 In an economic context,
examples of information we use to impose constraints (closures) are, for example,
a budget constraint, the non-negativity of prices, accounting identities, behavioral
constraints, or the average profit rate in an economy. So long as these constraints
are binding we should expect to find persistent macroeconomic phenomena consis-
tent with the PME. As Jaynes describes the PME, “when we make inferences based
on incomplete information, we should draw them from that probability distribution
that has the maximum entropy permitted by the information we do have.”(Jaynes,
1982)
In applications, inferences about a system from imposed informational con-
straints are typically made by using moment constraints as with the mean energy
constraint. The problem is then one of maximizing entropy subject to the normal-
ization constraint of probabilities summing to one, as well as any other constraints
that act on the system as a whole.11 From this perspective, we can see that for
Jaynes the ensemble of “bins” and their relative probabilities describe a certain
state of knowledge and for this reason he believed the connection between Shan-
non’s information theory and statistical mechanics was that the former justified the
latter.
We stress that the concept of entropy in economics is a general method of in-
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ference that is not in direct correspondence with the physical theory of thermody-
namics. We use the PME to make inferences about the mechanisms and processes
in a complex system with many degree of freedom that generate stable macroscopic
regularities. The predictive relevance of maximum entropy inference is conditional
on the ability of the statistical model to produce observable regularities in the sys-
tem under analysis. The statistical model is determined by information about the
system incorporated as constraints that modify the predictive distribution. Thus,
the probability distribution that achieves maximum entropy over the relevant do-
main is a logically equivalent representation of our state of knowledge. That is,
the maximum entropy distribution expresses what we know while being maximally
non-committal toward what we do not.
3.3 Farjoun and Machover’s gamma conjecture
FM implicitly follow this logic in arguing that, “[t]he chaotic movement in the market
of millions of commodities and of tens of thousands of capitalists chasing each other
and competing over finite resources and markets, cannot be captured by the average
rate of profit, any more than the global law of the apparently random movement of
many millions of molecules in a container of gas can be captured by their average
speed.” (Farjoun and Machover, 1983, p. 68) They predict a probabilistic approach
to better explain this chaotic movement, and derive two claims from it. First,
that the distribution should not change its shape or location over time, that is,
that the profit rate distribution is stationary. This is the notion of a statistical
equilibrium, as opposed to a deterministic one. Secondly, they predict the shape of
the distribution by reasoning that “In a gas at equilibrium, the total kinetic energy
of all the molecules is a given quantity. It can then be shown that the ‘most chaotic’
[the maximum entropy] partition of this total kinetic energy among the molecules
results in a gamma distribution... if we consider that in any given short period there
is a more-or-less fixed amount of social surplus... and that capitalist competition is
a very disorderly mechanism for partitioning this surplus among capitalists in the
form of profit, then the analogy of statistical mechanics suggests that R [the rate of
profit] may also have a gamma distribution.”(Farjoun and Machover, 1983, p. 68)
The gamma distribution FM propose is defined for a continuous random quantity
X ∈ [0,∞) by two parameters α > 0, β > 0
G[x;α, β] = β
α
Γ[α]
x(α−1)e−βx (5)
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where brackets indicate arguments of functions, α is the shape parameter of the
positively skewed distribution, and β is a rate parameter. The expected value of
a gamma distribution is E[x] = αβ and the variance V ar[x] =
α
β2
. Figure 3 shows
the gamma distribution for various β while holding α = 4 (Farjoun and Machover,
1983, p. 165).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Using the PME, we can ascertain that FM’s claim that the annual profits in an
economy should be partitioned so as to give rise to a gamma distribution rests on
particular constraints on the entropy maximization program: a non-negative sup-
port, and fixed arithmetic and geometric means. In Appendix B, we show that
the gamma distribution indeed arises from these three constraints. For these con-
straints to apply, they should be motivated using economic theory, as they amount
to assumption of three instances of information about the economy. First, non-
negativity of profit rates, secondly, a “conserved” mean profit rate. Thirdly, the
geometric mean constraint translates into the constant average growth rate of the
size of profits for firms of any size or “scale invariance” of profit rates. FM do not
spell out nor motivate these assumptions claiming too great “technical and concep-
tual difficulties” (Farjoun and Machover, 1983, 239, endnote 21), but simply claim a
gamma distribution in analogy with a gas. Once these assumptions are spelled out
however, our theoretical prior is from the beginning that this model is misspecified
as the gamma distribution is only defined on the positive support [0,∞) which a
priori excludes negative profit rates. We are more agnostic about the other two con-
straints, which might possibly be justified from economic theory. A look at actual
profit rate distributions will test the accuracy of our information based on which we
infer a distributional shape.
4 Data and Plot Method
4.1 Data
The data we examine is from the merged Compustat/CRSP Annual Northern Amer-
ican Fundamentals database comprising US stock market-listed companies spanning
the years 1962-2014,12 for which the distribution of profit rate cross sections have
not yet been analyzed. Government as well as financial services, real estate, and
insurance have been excluded because the former does not partake in competition
and the latter adhere to different accounting conventions for revenue calculation
that makes this part of the industries incomparable. We calculate the profit rate by
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dividing the difference of net sales and operating costs, which equals gross profit, by
the book value of total assets. From a Marxian point of view, the income accruing
to capitalists should ideally be divided by “total capital advanced,” which includes
fixed assets, raw materials and unused labor power, and commercial and financial
capital (Basu, 2013). Total assets is an incomplete, but non-restrictive measure of
“capital advanced” that is measured at historical cost. From our theoretical per-
spective, assets measured at “replacement cost” would be a more consistent measure
of capital advanced, however, such a measure is unavailable. Additionally, we do
not believe the two measures will deviate in any systematic or meaningful way at
this level of analysis.
As for comparability of results with those in FM (chapter 7) this cannot be
ascertained since FM do not disclose how their measure of capital is defined. Unlike
FM who attempt to partition indivisible units of capital across profit rate bins we
choose to partition indivisible firms across profit rate bins due to the structure of
the data. We emphasize the fact that Compustat only provides ex post year-end
annual profit rate observations while the competitive process that generates the
equilibrium distribution is unobserved. With this in mind, a complete description
of the dynamic entry and exit process that gives rise to the equilibrium profit rate
distribution is not possible and the problem is, therefore, ill-posed and incomplete.
That is, while a firm like Apple Inc. exists in the dataset for 35 years, they have
competed in many different niche markets such as phones, computers, televisions,
tablets, video game consoles, and watches; where Apple has found themselves in an
unprofitable position they have exited the market (e.g. the Apple Pippin). It is the
simultaneous decisions of many similar firms to enter and exit particular markets
that gives rise to the observed profit rate distribution; however, inference is limited
to year end “snapshots” of this complex dynamic process.
Lastly, outliers have been removed using a nonrestrictive Bayesian filter which
comprise only 3 per cent of the data. Details about the filter are in (Scharfenaker and
Semieniuk, 2015). Our dataset, therefore, is comprised of firms under the standard
industrial classification (SIC) numbers 1000-6000 and 7000-9000, containing a total
of 285,698 observations with on average 5,390 annual observations. The summary
statistics for the complete data set are presented in Table 1. Appendix A contains
full details about constructing the dataset.
[Table 1 about here.]
Firm level profit rate distributions have not yet been analyzed in this manner.13
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4.2 Logarithmic density plots
When plotting the histograms of profit rates, logarithmic density scales will be used.
This is common in analyzing distributional shapes in the industrial organization lit-
erature because it facilitates identification of exponential distributions and power
laws (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006; M. Stanley et al., 1996). The effect of rescaling is
illustrated in Figure 2. Both plots show the same normal, Laplace, and gamma den-
sity where the left plot has a linear density scale and the right one has a logarithmic
one. (Double) exponential distributions with their fatter tails than normal ones can
be easily identified because they appear as a straight line (where the slope equals the
parameter of the exponential distribution), which will be important when analyzing
the empirical distributions. The Laplace distribution assumes a tent shape, mak-
ing it easy to distinguish it from a normal distribution. The gamma distribution’s
positive tail also approximates a straight line for α ≈ 1 (in the plot α = 4). In log
plots of empirical distributions it is important not to exaggerate the significance of
variations in the tails, as these are actually very low densities with small variations,
which are magnified due to the re-scaling.
[Figure 2 about here.]
5 Empirical Densities
We plot the empirical density of profit rate cross sections for a selection of years in
Figure 3 on a log probability scale which emphasizes the tent shape of the distri-
bution. The points correspond to the middle of the histogram bin for a given year.
Histograms are stacked in the same plot window with different markers for every
cross section plotted at five year intervals, the upper for the years 1965-1980 and
the lower one with years spanning 1985-2010.
[Figure 3 about here.]
5.1 Time invariance of the profit rate distribution
What immediately stands out from these figures is first, how remarkably organized
the profit rate observations are into a stationary distribution. The empirical den-
sities display a clear tent shape characteristic of the Laplace distribution. We can
also see that the majority of firms achieve profit rates between -20 and +50 per
cent, but there are important outliers in every year on both sides. In every year the
distribution has roughly the same mode, and densities fall off in exactly the same
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pattern. Slight differences only occur in the tails, but recalling the log scale of the
density axis, these variations are very slight indeed and to be expected in noisy,
observational data. Clearly, FM’s first conjecture – that profit rate distributions are
expected to be organized into a time invariant distribution – is well supported by
the data. The statistical equilibrium hypothesis is a good one for the time period
both in the upper and lower plots.
The only change to the shape of the distribution occurs in the 1980s, when the
negative tail swells, resulting from an increasing amount of firms that realize less
than the modal profit rate and remain alive and active. This lends a negative skew
to the erstwhile symmetric distribution and suggests there are two “eras” spanned
by the data. It has been observed that starting in the 1980s, profitability and
net worth measures for firms in all industries began to drop (Peristiani and Hong,
2004).14 The profit rate cross sections suggest that the statistical equilibrium is
perturbed through a new constraint on firm activity (survival at lower profit rates),
but that it reasserts itself in a new form.
Another important observation from Figure 3 is the astounding organization of
profit rates above the mode relative to profit rates below the mode. It appears as
if the dynamic pressures exerted on firms earning above the most likely, or modal
rate of profit leads to far greater stability of the macroscopic state of profit rates.
This may suggest that “the general rate of profit,” as put forth by classical political
economists as a type of “reference rate” with which entry and exit decisions would
be determined, might appropriately be captured by the mode of the distribution.
This reference rate of profit is typically equated with the average rate of profit and
in the case that the distribution is symmetric the mode will coincide with the mean
as well as the median. In the later decades of our sample, however, the average lies
to the left of the mode due to the asymmetry of the distribution.
In contrast to FM, who use limited sectoral data of the total of British man-
ufacturing industries, the far more comprehensive Compustat dataset shows the
distribution of profit rates for almost all industries. Further, the apparent statisti-
cal equilibrium Laplace distribution is robust to disaggregation by industry. Plots
of industry-wide and sectoral distributions are presented in Appendix C and show
that the statistical equilibrium distribution is present at the one- and two-digit SIC
sectoral industrial group level.
5.2 The shape of the distribution
The profit rate distribution is distinctly non-normal and hence deviations from the
dominant average are not well explained as a sample of independently and iden-
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tically distributed random variables that tend to a normal distribution. But the
distribution is also markedly non-gamma, and this is clear first from the fact that
the support of the distribution significantly extends into the negative realm, second,
the gamma distribution is positively rather than negatively skewed, and last, the
sharp peakedness and tent shape that appears in the log histogram is more charac-
teristic of the Laplace distribution.15 The empirical evidence appears to contradict
FM’s conjecture; yet, a careful discussion of their argument yields additional infor-
mation about the actual shape of the distribution. FM are acutely aware of the
non-negativity problem and immediately question “whether it is reasonable to as-
sume that fR(r) is equal, or very close, to 0 for all negative r. This would mean, in
other words, that in a state of equilibrium only a negligible proportion of the total
capital has a negative rate of profit (that is, makes a loss).”(Farjoun and Machover,
1983, p. 66) While they claim that “At first sight it would seem that this assumption
is quite unrealistic,” FM nevertheless argue in favor of the gamma distribution due
to their belief that
1. In normal times the proportion of capital (out of the total capital of the
economy) in the negative rate-of-profit brackets is much smaller than first
impressions suggest.
2. Among the firms that actually do make a loss, there is usually a disproportion-
ately high number of small firms (firms with a small amount of capital). For
this reason the proportion of loss-making capital (out of the economy’s total
capital) is considerably smaller than the number of loss-making firms would
suggest.
3. When a firm is reported to be making a ‘loss’, what is usually meant is a
loss after payment of interest on the capital it has borrowed. This is the ‘loss’
shown in the balance-sheet of the firm. However, for the purpose of comparison
with our model, the interest paid by the firm must be taken as part of the
profit. A firm whose rate of profit (in our sense) is positive but considerably
lower than the current rate of interest, and whose capital is partly borrowed,
may end up (after payment of interest) with a net loss on its balance-sheet.16
The first point is not well supported in our dataset as firms realizing negative
rates of profit comprise an astounding 20 per cent of total observations and in
some years over 30 per cent of all profit rates are negative. While there is a clear
cyclicality to the percentage of negative profit rate observations to total observations
in Figure 4, it appears that the “normal times” of which FM speak may have changed
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since the time of their writing. The prevalence of negative profit rates may be
considered a norm and this trend certainly warrants further research.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The second point, that on average negative profits are made by small firms, is
supported by our data until the 1980s, but fails to hold true in the newer decades.
We illustrate this in Figure 5 by showing Tukey box plots of profit rates conditional
on firm size.17 We pool all observations for each era and display the distribution of
profit rates for each capital percentile.
[Figure 5 about here.]
From Figure 5 we can see that negative profit rates until around 1980 are hardly
existent except for very small firms. The lower inter-quartile bound is negative only
until the the fifth percentile, meaning more than one quarter of firms in that size
bracket realize negative profit rates. This condition changes considerably later on
when negative profit rates are pervasive for at least the first four deciles and not
until the 45th percentile does the inter-quartile range lie exclusively above zero.
Even some of the largest firms suffer from negative profits and the phenomenon of
negative profit rates is spread over the entire size distribution in both eras. This
mass of firms earning negative profit rates adds the negative asymmetry to the
distribution that is evident in Figure 3. The white diamonds are average profit
rates conditional on firm size and only coincide with the median and mode above
the 5th decile of the size distribution (half of the dataset), which is where the profit
rate distribution becomes symmetric. It is important to realize that the shift is
primarily in the higher moments of the distribution, and not a shift of the whole
distribution and its first moment. However, the skew implies that first moment and
the mode of profit rate realizations no longer coincide.
FM’s last point that concerns the definition of profit rates is accounted for by
our calculation that measures gross profits as total revenue less operating expenses
before depreciation. It is from this gross pool of surplus that profit is distributed
post festum to interest payments on capital, taxes, et cetera, leaving more meagre
returns for the production capitalists. But the present analysis shows that some 20
to 35 per cent of firms even struggle with negative gross profit rates.
It follows, therefore, that negative profit rates are an important characteristic
of the general profit rate distribution and assuming non-negativity would indeed
amount to an “extremely rigid” approach that is not, “at all realistic [..] as an
approximate description of the behaviour of a real capitalist economy” (Farjoun
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and Machover, 1983, p. 66). It is also important to realize that non-negativity
is a gratuitous assumption in the statistical approach to economic theory. In our
discussion of the results in the next section, we show that reasoning based on the
PME can equally well lead to a distribution, that can better capture the shape of
the statistical equilibrium for negative values. It can be motivated in the same way
as we did above for the gamma distribution.
6 An Alternative Theoretical Distribution
Having established that profit rates are not well approximated by a gamma distribu-
tion, but pursuing a statistical equilibrium approach, the foregoing visual inspection
leads us to propose a Laplace or double exponential distribution as the theoretical
distribution that better approximates the shape of the empirical one. The Laplace
distribution is the maximum entropy distribution when the mean absolute size of
deviations from the average of the quantity under consideration is constrained and
the continuous random variable X is non-vanishing on the open support (−∞,∞)
(Kotz, Kozubowski, and Podgo´rski, 2001). From the point of view of economic
theory, the constraint leading to the Laplace distribution can be interpreted as
competitive pressure on the dispersion of profit rates, without setting an absolute
lower boundary such as non-negativity. Firms straying too far above the general rate
of profit are reined in by stricter competition from new entrants. Firms sustaining
negative profits for too long change sectors or go out of business.
6.1 The Laplace distribution as a candidate
Formally, the Laplace distribution arises from the following maximum entropy pro-
gramming problem:
max
{p[x]≥0 |x∈R}
−
∫ ∞
−∞
p[x]log[p[x]]dx
subject to
∫ ∞
−∞
|x− µ|p[x]dx = c
and
∫ ∞
−∞
p[x]dx = 1
(6)
where c > 0 is a constant and µ ∈ R is the location parameter corresponding to a
reference rate of profit.18 When plugging the new constraints into the general form
of the mathematical programming problem posed in Appendix B, the solution is the
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Laplace distribution:
L[x; c, µ] = 1
2c
e−|x−µ|/c (7)
Visual inspection of the fit suggests that this density function fits the data well
for all firms until 1980, as seen in Figure 6, and is surprisingly parsimonious in its
single moment constraint. Other studies tend to use distributions with a higher
number of parameters, which are theoretically more difficult to motivate (Buldyrev
et al., 2007). Using the PME highlights this issue, as each additional parameter also
requires an additional constraint that must be motivated by information about the
distribution derived from economic theory. Those constraints that are redundant
will not change the maximum entropy distribution and those that are unwarranted
or incorrect will lead to poor predictive distributions.
[Figure 6 about here.]
In the newer era we have seen that the negative tail becomes fatter and an asym-
metry develops. This translates into a skewed density plot in Figure 7, suggesting
that while the symmetric Laplace model does a remarkable job of capturing the ma-
jor features of the profit rate distribution, there appear to be some secular trends
in the higher moments of the distribution that the single constraint Laplace model
does not predict.
6.2 Beyond symmetric Laplace
One way of dealing with the asymmetry is to assume that the relevant process gener-
ating the equilibrium profit rate distribution is for a subset of larger more established
firms only. Smaller firms are then subject to separate constraints. Indeed, the ear-
lier boxplot in Figure 5 showed that above the median firm size, symmetry asserts
itself even in the newer period. Pursuing this logic, as did Alfarano et al. (2012),
we end up discarding a substantial amount of data and information and can only
reason about a minor subset of the population of firms embroiled in competition.
This raises the question of how competition among small, and competition among
large firms influence each other. On the other hand, assuming that all firms are
competing with each other, and following the logic of Jaynes (1979), this innovation
in the distribution can be accounted for by additional constraints. We propose one
possible avenue for approaching this problem by solving for the maximum entropy
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distribution with an additional constraint motivated by economic theory, but leave
the question open for further research.
[Figure 7 about here.]
In order to incorporate additional information that will modify the maximum
entropy distribution we can impose a constraint that will introduce an asymmetry
into the distribution. One logical candidate is to treat infra- and supra-modal obser-
vations as subject to separate mean constraints. Formally, the constraint becomes
a piecewise mean constraint around the modal, reference rate of profit (µ).
max
{p[x]≥0 |x∈R}
−
∫ ∞
−∞
p[x]log[p[x]]dx
subject to
∫ µ
−∞
(µ− x)p[x]dx = c1,∫ ∞
µ
(x− µ)p[x]dx = c2,∫ ∞
−∞
p[x]dx = 1
(8)
The mathematical solution to this modified programming problem is the asym-
metric Laplace distribution (Kotz, Kozubowski, and Podgo´rski, 2001; Kotz, Kozubowski,
and Podgo´rski, 2002):
AL[x; c1, c2, µ] = 1(√
c1 +
√
c2
)2

e
(x−µ)√
c1c2+c1 if x ≤ µ
e
− (x−µ)√
c1c2+c2 if x > µ
(9)
where c1, c2 > 0 and µ ∈ R. The addition of the piecewise constraint greatly im-
proves the fit of the distribution as is evident in Figure 7. The additional constraint
continues to capture the stable exponential character of supra-modal profit rates
while also accounting for the asymmetry of the distribution. Although infra-modal
profit rates after 1980 no longer appear as a straight line – indicating a trend in
the higher moments of the infra-modal part of the distribution – the two constraint
maximum entropy asymmetric Laplace specification is remarkably more successful
at capturing the general structure of the profit rate distribution throughout the
sample.
Formally, these constraints separate positive and negative deviations from the
mode into two different components of the aggregate distribution. Theoretically,
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this parametrization of the asymmetric Laplace distribution is motivated by the
idea of separate entry and exit dynamics where firms below the modal, or reference
rate of profit, are worked upon by different pressures from the macro environment
than those on the positive side. For supra-modal firms, there are strong organizing
principles that structure the firm population’s ability to generate returns, which
result in a statistical equilibrium. That is, entry competition as captured by the c1
constraint is constantly producing an exponential distribution above the mode or
general rate of profit. This results in a stable c1 over the entire sample period which
is seen in Figure 8. On the other hand, the exit pressure on infra-modal firms –
captured by the c2 constraint – appears to be trending downwards, allowing an ever
greater deviation in losses for a growing fraction of U.S. stock-market listed firms,
that additionally fluctuates at business cycle frequencies.
[Figure 8 about here.]
We believe these constraints are theoretically consistent with a “classical” theory
of competition where profitability is defined in reference to a general rate of profit
that in turn regulates the distribution of capital. Further, we see no a priori reason to
believe the pressures acting on capital realizing returns below the general rate to be
the same as those acting on capital realizing returns above the general rate. In fact,
a reasonable prior would be that firms facing exit pressures, such as the liquidation
of used capital stock, face a quite different environment than firms attempting to
maintain their relatively profitable position or of new firms entering these relatively
profitable markets. This line of reasoning leads to explicit consideration of the joint
distribution of unobserved entry and exit decisions and the way these decisions
indirectly determine the marginal distribution of profit rates observed here.19 When
c1 = c2 the constraint becomes redundant and the maximum entropy distribution
collapses into the symmetric Laplace distribution. Interestingly, this appears to be
the case prior to 1980, suggesting more “symmetric” pressures across the spectrum
of profitability.
Conventional goodness-of-fit tests like the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test show that
neither symmetric nor asymmetric Laplace distributions capture all features of the
noisy empirical data. We note that these tests do not impose a penalty for addi-
tional model complexity and with large samples sizes are highly sensitive to small
deviations from the candidate distribution. We favor the application of the more
sensitive entropy based information distinguishability criterion (Soofi and Retzer,
2002) that shows that the asymmetric Laplace candidate captures more than 90
per cent of the informational content in the empirical distribution. Explaining the
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residual indeterminacy would require additional constraints motived by economic
theory that avoid overfitting. Details and output of these measures are discussed in
Appendix D.
In summary, although we have an incomplete description of the distribution of
profit rates in the newer era, we still see a remarkable amount of organization of
the distribution in both eras and we believe this organization represents important
information about the competitive process, which can largely be captured by a
parsimonious maximum entropy model. The apparent change in the equilibrium
distribution suggests our knowledge about the newer era may be incomplete and new
information needs to be accounted for. The proposed statistical approach allows the
researcher to confront and study this phenomenon and challenges economic theory
to investigate this development more closely.
6.3 Economics and the Principle of Maximum Entropy
Before concluding, we stress the potential of the PME method of inference for
economics. FM claimed loosely that competition between firms could be seen as
molecules interacting in a gas, therefore profit rates – like the characteristics of
molecules – should be distributed as a gamma distribution. We have shown that
starting from maximum entropy as a general principle of inference forces the re-
searcher to be precise about the constraints that lead to a particular maximum
entropy distribution and that the predictive relevance of maximum entropy infer-
ence is conditional on the ability of the statistical model to produce observable
regularities in the system under analysis. The case of the non-negativity assump-
tion for a gamma distribution allowed us to exclude the gamma distribution as a
candidate due to strict inability to ever predict a negative profit rate.
Crucially, we believe that in the selection of alternative candidate distributions,
additional constraints on the maximum entropy program require economic justifi-
cation. Insight into competition between firms is not improved simply by observing
that the data is better approximated by an asymmetric exponential power distribu-
tion than an asymmetric Laplace distribution (Appendix D), which is not surprising
given the additional model complexity. The data tell us that there is additional in-
formation that is not explained by existing constraints, but theory must be able
to motivate constraints that can account for this additional information. This may
require developing theoretical insights based on a more granular examination of the
irregularities, such as the characteristics of the firms that make the negative tail
fatter than the positive one. The joint application of the PME coupled with moti-
vation from economic theory can lead to new research questions and insights about
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the profit rate. It is obvious that this method of inference may be applied to any
quantity in economics for which an ensemble can be constructed.
7 Conclusion
The distribution of the rate of profit is the outcome of an enormous number of
independent decisions of individual firms to compete in a multitude of disparate
markets. It is an unintended consequence of individual capitals seeking higher rates
of return which gives rise to observed statistical regularities. The present research
into the empirical distribution of firm profit rates started from the assertion that
the general form of the profit rate distribution arising from this disorderly process
is neither degenerate nor an arbitrary time variant one. For publicly traded U.S.
firms, we have shown that profit rates are extremely well organized into a tent
shape characteristic of the Laplace distribution. This distribution shows strong time
invariant qualities consistent with the statistical equilibrium hypothesis, displaying
only a shift in the higher moments in the 1980s towards a new, skewed invariant
distribution.
We have argued for the viability of statistical reasoning and the maximum en-
tropy approach for this problem and have shown that given the right information the
configuration of profit rates can be well approximated by a maximum entropy dis-
tribution with one to two constraints, both motivated by economic theory. For the
dataset that we considered, two paths of further research emerge from the present
study that we consider particularly promising for generating new insights. First,
identifying the relevant information about competition in the last three and half
decades that can account for the reconfiguration of the profit rate distribution and
formulating them as proper constraints may shed light on structural changes in
the competitive environment of the US economy. This will require more theorizing
about why firms that do less well than the general rate of profit can survive longer
now than in the period before the 1980s. Secondly, the lack of coincidence of the
distribution’s first moment and its mode due to the skew of the distribution leads
to the question what summary information about profit rates is sufficient to use in
analyzing an economy. Just as with heavily skewed income distributions, where the
average earning may not say much about the income of most households, a mean
profit rate pulled down by negative outliers may hide a “healthier” profit rate of the
large majority of firms when doing aggregate industry analysis.
This research, based on applying the principle of maximum entropy and ex-
plaining constraints with economic logic, leads to asking new questions about long-
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existing phenomena, not only for profit rates, but also in a number of other fields.
One example is the labor market where information about wages and obstacles to
mobility translated into constraints on possible wage distributions may reveal a sta-
tistical equilibrium in wage rates dependent on sector or country. Another is the
interpretation of firm rates of growth or capital accumulation as a process where
information about markets – and firm covariates such as the profit rate – may yield
a rich theory of statistical equilibrium in industrial dynamics. The increasing avail-
ability of micro-level datasets further encourages analyzing the whole distribution
of several economic variables rather than only one or at best two moments, which
are not sufficient to capture the information contained in the distribution in case of
non-Gaussian distributions.
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Notes
1See Jensen (1953) and Pikler (1951) for early developments of similar stochastic modeling.
2The same can be said of Fro¨hlich (2013) who argues in favor of the gamma distribution, but
does not explain the underlying assumptions linking it to a statistical equilibrium framework.
3See Frantini and Naccarato (2016) for a fully developed stochastic model of price gravitation
from a classical perspective.
4See Shaikh (2016) for a discussion of equilibrium as a turbulent equalization process. Shaikh
argues that the “law of one price” disequalizes profit rates within an industry due to differing
technology, but that capital flows between industries into regulating capitals “turbulently equalizes”
the profit rate. Equilibrium, in this sense is perpetual fluctuation of the profit rates of regulating
capitals (approximated by the “incremental rate of profit”) around a common average value.
5See Mirowski (1991).
6The term was introduced by Rudolph Clausius in the 1850s as a measure of energy dissipation in
thermodynamic systems. However, since Claude Shannon’s pioneering work on information theory
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(Shannon, 1948) the term has been used to describe a variety of mathematical expressions and the
one above has been referred to as the “classical” Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropy (A. N. Gorban,
P. A. Gorban, and Judge, 2010).
7The solution to this problem is the exponential distribution (Kapur and Kesavan, 1992).
8These conditions were (1) for a discrete random variable with uniform probabilities the uncer-
tainty should be a monotonically increasing function of the number of outcomes for the random
variable, (2) if one splits an outcome category into a hierarchy of functional equations then the
uncertainty of the new extended system should be the sum of the uncertainty of the old system
plus the uncertainty of the new subsystems weighted by its probability, and (3) the entropy should
be a continuous function of the probabilities pi.
9Maximum entropy subject only to the normalization constraint is the uniform distribution.
Intuitively this corresponds to maximum uncertainty as each possible state is equally probable. On
the other hand, minimum entropy is represented by a degenerate distribution, which intuitively
represents maximum certainty, one outcome with a probability of one.
10Importantly, this inferential way of approaching entropy requires no additional assumptions
about ergodicity, and is thus immune to the criticism of, for instance, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen
(1971). As Jaynes (1979, 63-64, emphasis his) argued, with “the belief that a probability is not
respectable unless it is also a frequency, one attempts a direct calculation of frequencies, or tries to
guess the right “statistical assumption” about frequencies, even though the available information
does not consist of frequencies, but consists rather of partial knowledge of certain “macroscopic”
parameters... and the prediction s desired are not frequencies, but estimates of certain other
parameters... The real problem is not to determine frequencies, but to describe one’s state of
knowledge by a probability distribution.”
11This probability assignment of microstates will then describe the state of knowledge which we
have. An important implication of the PME is that in these problems the “imposed macroscopic
constraints surely do not determine any unique microscopic state; they ensure only that the state
vector is somewhere in the HPM [high probability manifold]... macroscopic experimental conditions
still leave billions of microscopic details undetermined” (Jaynes, 1979, p. 87). That is to say, the
aggregate does not favor one micro state over another, unless information about specific microstates
leads to different constraints that might give better macroscopic predictions.
12We follow the convention of Fama and French (1992) who point out that there is a serious
selection bias in pre-1962 data that is tilted toward big, historically successful firms.
13The only other work to examine firm level profit rate distributions, Alfarano et al. (2012), find
near-Laplace profit rate cross sections in a small sample of only long-lived firms from Thomson
Datastream data. Indeed, sample selection based on a covariate such as age or size for studying the
distributions of firm characteristics is justified under the prior belief that small or young firms belong
to an entirely different set of data that are subject to separate “entry and exit” dynamics, which
do not play a significant role in determining the statistical equilibrium distribution. However, the
essentially arbitrary determination of what is “long lived” or “large” may prevent an understanding
how the large majority of competitive firm profit rates are distributed, since a large share of firms
are small or short-lived. We believe a more flexible method for sample selection that explicitly
models the noise and signal can improve this line of research.
14It is remarkable that this shift coincides with the transition to what has been called a “neolib-
eral” economic environment in the US.
15The Laplace distribution has also been found to describe firm growth rates (Bottazzi and
Secchi, 2003a; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003b; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006) and a sample of profit rates
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in long-lived firms (Alfarano et al., 2012).
16This enumeration cites Farjoun and Machover (1983, p. 67).
17Tukey box plots show observations removed more than 1.5 times the length of the interquartile
support from either the upper or lower quartile as dots rather than whiskers.
18The location parameter µ is a fixed reference rate of profit to which firms compare their indi-
vidual profit rates. In the theoretical density, µ is equal to the mean, median, and mode due to the
symmetry of the Laplace distribution that need not enter the programming problem as an explicit
constraint. Any translation of the distribution necessarily does not change its entropy. See section
3.1.2 in Kapur (1989) for a variety of derivations of the maximum entropy Laplace distribution
with a location parameter as well as remark 3.4.5 in Kotz, Kozubowski, and Podgo´rski (2001).
19See Scharfenaker (2015) for a more thorough discussion of this problem as well as a proposed
quantal response model of firm competition.
Appendix A: Data Sources
Data is gathered from the merged Compustat/CRSP Annual Northern American
Fundamentals database through the University of Sussex. We extract yearly ob-
servations of the variables AT = Total Assets, REVT = total revenue, XOPR =
operating cost, SIC = Standard Industry Code, FYR = year, CONM = company
name, from 1962 through 2014. Subtracting XOPR from REVT and dividing by AT
gives the conventional measure of return on assets (ROA) which we use as proxy
for gross profit rates. Total assets are reported according to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) and are measured at historical cost.
Our raw data set consists of 467,666 observations of each indicator. Subtracting
completely missing values, government and finance, insurance and real estate - gov-
ernment because it is not engaged in a search for profit maximization but pursues
other objectives and finance et al. because the different accounting methods where
part of income is not recorded in REVT, leading to profit rates almost zero - we
impute the remaining missing values under the assumption of values missing at ran-
dom. Our completed case dataset contains 294,476 observations or roughly 7,177
observations per year. This data contains outliers of profit rates greater than 108
and less than −105 per cent. Our prior is that these observations are an artifact of
the ratio we use to calculate profit rates and are therefore noise. We pass our data
set year by year through a Bayesian filter that models the data as a mixture of a
“signal” Laplace and a diffuse Gaussian “noise” distribution. This method uses a
Gibbs sampler to assign each firm a latent variable with posterior probability dis-
tribution of either belonging to the “signal” or “noise.” We make an unrestrictive
decision by discarding all observation with latent posterior mean below 0.05 per
cent chance of belonging to the signal. Using this method we discard only 3 per
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cent of our data effectively ridding our data set of massive outliers with a minimal
loss of information. Due to the likelihood dominance of our data this procedure will
have imperceptible effects on the general form of the empirical distribution. The
advantage of our Bayesian filter compared to an ad hoc truncation of the dataset
(e.g. clipping the top and bottom 1 per cent) is that it endogenizes our sample
selection based on our prior that large outliers are noise, and explains outliers as
generated by a different distribution. Since any data truncation would have to be
based on some “trial and error” procedure of adequately ridding “unacceptably”
large outliers we prefer an endogenous selection process that makes this prior ex-
plicit. The remaining data set contains 285,698 observations. It is important to note
that due to the extremely diffuse Gaussian noise component of the mixture filter,
filtering only removes observations far out in the tails, and hence does not influence
the density of the empirical distribution except at the extreme outliers in the top
and bottom two percentiles. Full details on the filter can be found in Scharfenaker
and Semieniuk (2015).
Appendix B: The Maximum Entropy Derivation of the
Gibbs Distribution
Jaynes’ principle of maximum entropy inference can be formalized by first trans-
lating the assumed properties of a system into moment constraints and then by
maximization of uncertainty subject to these constraints via the entropy functional
H[x] = − ∫ p[x]log[p[x]]dx. A “constraint” is understood as any information that
leads one to modify a probability distribution. The problem is then one of con-
strained optimization.
To attain the general solution to this problem consider a finite set of N polyno-
mials {gi[x]} for a continuous variable x ∈ R with an undefined probability density
p[x]. Define the ith-moment Mi as:∫
p[x]gi[x]dx = Mi i = 1, 2, ..., N (2)
Setting g0[x] ≡ 1 and M0 ≡ 1 as the constraint corresponding to normalization
assures p[x] will be a probability density function. The problem of maximum en-
tropy inference is to find p[x] subject to the requirement that uncertainty (H[x]) is
maximized subject to information we have expressed as moment constraints. What
this achieves is maximal ignorance given the information available and an “insur-
ance policy” against gratuitous assumptions or spurious details unwarranted by the
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data. The constrained maximization problem is:
max
{p[x]≥0| x∈X}
−
∫
p[x]log[p[x]]dx
subject to
∫
p[x]gi[x]dx = Mi
(3)
Using Lagrange multipliers for each moment constraint form the augmented
functional:
L ≡ −
∫
p[x]log[p[x]]dx−
N∑
i=0
λi
(∫
p[x]gi[x]dx−Mi
)
(4)
We find the critical points by differentiating the functional with respect to p[x]
according to the Euler-Lagrange equation ∂F∂f [x]− ddx( ∂F∂f ′[x]) = 0. Noticing the second
term is equal to zero we get:
∂L
∂p[x]
= −(1 + log[p[x]])−
N∑
i=0
λigi[x] = 0 (5)
Solving for p[x] results in the maximum entropy distribution:
p[x] = Z[λ]e−
∑N
i=1 λigi[x] (6)
where Z[λ] = e1+λ0 is the undetermined normalization constant referred to as the
partition function. The family of distributions of this form are known as the expo-
nential family and Eq. 6 is called the Gibbs distribution.
Determining the Lagrange multipliers through moment constraints is non-trivial,
however, FM’s assumption of a maximum entropy gamma distribution is easily
attained by maximizing H[x] with a constraint on support [0,∞), the arithmetic
mean (x¯), and geometric mean (xˆ) of a random variable X ∈ Rx≥0.
Appendix C: Empirical Densities by Industry
In this appendix we show the robustness of the profit rate distribution to disaggre-
gation. Each plot in Figure 9 shows the profit rate distribution at the two-digit SIC
level embedded in the one-digit SIC industry for each era. At the one-digit level
(agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, trade and transportation, and
services) - some industries are combined for visual clarity - the industry profit rate
distribution is plotted as a solid line, while at the two-digit level we maintain the
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plotting method from above. This way the clustering of industries at the two-digit
SIC level around their parent industry is evident.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Appendix D: Distribution Fit Tests
Nonparametric goodness-of-fit tests, such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, reject
the hypothesis that annual cross sections of profit rates belong to the class of Laplace
distributions for almost every year, and to the Asymmetric Laplace distribution for
every year after 1967. In order to get more insight into the comparative goodness
of fit of the data to different distributions, we use the more sensitive information
theoretic measure of fit called the information distinguishability statistic (ID) pro-
posed by Soofi and Retzer (2002). The ID is a normalized measure of how well a
proposed parametric distribution function exploits the informational content of an
empirical distribution. The ID is defined as:
ID[f ; f∗|θ] = 1− e−∆H[f ;f∗|θ] (2)
where −∆H[f ; f∗|θ] is the entropy difference between the empirical histogram distri-
bution (f) and a parametric functional distribution (f∗|θ) where θ is the maximum
likelihood estimates of f∗. An ID[f ; f∗|θ] = 0 implies f∗ is a perfect parameter-
ization of f , i.e f∗ exploits all information contained in the data distribution. If
1 > ID[f ; f∗|θ] > 0 then there remains residual indeterminacy that the model does
not explain.
Figure 10 shows the ID measure for four distributions and the inset shows the
low p-values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the symmetric and asymmetric
Laplace candidates that yields little information about the difference in fit. For the
ID criterion, on the other hand, we can see that up to 1980 both the Laplace and
asymmetric Laplace distribution capture an average of roughly 95 per cent of the
informational content of the data. After 1980, the informational content exploited
by the Laplace distribution deteriorates sharply. The asymmetric Laplace continues
to capture on average roughly 93 per cent of the informational content of the data,
while the more complex three parameter asymmetric exponential power distribution
on average captures 95 per cent of the information over the entire sample; a minimal
informational gain over the more parsimonious model. The additional complexity
of the asymmetric exponential power distribution arises through added constraints
on the maximum entropy program which we do not believe have a clear theoretical
30
justification.
[Figure 10 about here.]
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Figure 1: Density plot of the gamma distribution, for β = {20, 40, 80} and α = 4.
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Figure 2: Density plots on a linear (left) and log scale (right) for the normal dis-
tribution (solid line), Laplace distribution (dashed line), and gamma distribution
(dotted line).
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Figure 3: Stacked histogram plots on a log density scale of profit rates (r) for select
years. Each shaped point corresponds to the center of the histogram bar for that
year. Histograms are stacked in order to show the time invariance of the distribution
suggestive of statistical equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Percentage of negative profit rate observations by year.
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Figure 5: Box plots of profit rates conditional on capital percentile for pooled data
between 1962 and 1980 (top) and 1981 to 2014 (bottom). Box plots show the
median (black dash), inter-quartile range (box). Outliers appear as points beyond
1.5 times the inter-quartile range. White diamonds are the mean profit rates for
that percentile which only correspond to the median for the symmetric distribution.
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Figure 6: Stacked histogram plots on a log density scale of profit rates (r) for select
years for all firms until 1980 with maximum likelihood fitted Laplace distribution
(L).
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Figure 7: Top: Stacked histogram plots for select years after 1980. Dashed lines
represent the maximum likelihood fit of the Laplace distribution (L). Bottom:
Stacked histogram plots for select years after 1980. Dashed lines represent the
maximum likelihood fit of the asymmetric Laplace distribution (AL).
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Figure 8: Maximum likelihood estimates of µ, c1, and c2 from Eq. 9. Error bars are
vanishingly small.
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Figure 9: Histogram plots on a log density scale of profit rates (r) by 2-digit SIC
code. Years 1962-1980 are plotted on the left column and years 1981-2014 are plotted
on the right column. Solid lines are the sectoral (1-digit SIC) distribution, e.g. for
all of manufacturing firms.
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Figure 10: Information distinguishability between four proposed models of increas-
ing complexity. The normal (N ) and Laplace (L) are two parameter models, the
asymmetric Laplace (AL) is a three parameter model, and the asymmetric exponen-
tial power (AEP) is a four parameter model. The inset in the top left shows annual
p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of goodness of fit of data cross-sections
to the Laplace (L) and the asymmetric Laplace (AL) distributions.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of pooled profit rates (r).
Min 5 Perc. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd
Qu.
95
Perc.
Max
r -1.616 -0.406 0.033 0.112 0.062 0.173 0.294 1.801
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